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INTRODUCTION
In times of national crisis, the government often endows itself with
broad and unprecedented powers.1 Following the events on September 11,
2001, the United States government enhanced the scope of its surveillance
capabilities in the name of preventing terrorist activity; privacy was second to alleged safety as Congress reacted rashly to pass legislation.2 As
the United States responds to the global crisis of COVID-19, surveillance

† Emma Mendelson is a part-time 3L at CUNY School of Law.
1 See, e.g., Alex Joel, 9/11 All Over Again, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 10, 2020),
https://perma.cc/7YUL-X88P; Emergency Banking Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 73-1, 48 Stat. 1
(1933); War Powers Act of 1941, Pub. L. No. 77-354, 55 Stat. 838.
2 Peter Swire, Security, Privacy and the Coronavirus: Lessons from 9/11, LAWFARE
(Mar. 24, 2020, 2:46 PM), https://perma.cc/93RB-LWTP.
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has returned as an integral tool for national security: Both local and federal governments are using location metadata and health data to assist in
preventing the disease’s spread.3
“Contact [or proximity] tracing—which involves figuring out who
an infected person has been in contact with and trying to prevent them
from infecting others—is one of the most promising solutions” for monitoring COVID-19 and has manifested through government contracts with
private technology providers like Google and Apple.4 These private,
third-party corporations collect not only content-based data (e.g., e-mails
and direct messages) from their users, but also metadata, such as user location, which is continuously and passively uploaded into each of the
companies’ servers.5 While content-based data have been given certain
legal protections,6 the government’s acquisition of metadata from private,
third parties is still open to interpretation.7
During the response to the COVID-19 pandemic, there has been a
key shift in the “expected” surveilled population8 from the post-9/11 era.
3

CDC COVID-19 Surveillance, Subheading of FAQ: COVID-19 Data and Surveillance,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://perma.cc/L5YC-N3P8 (last updated Nov.
20, 2020); COVIDView Weekly Summary, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://perma.cc/E74F-WHBF (last updated Sept. 28, 2020); Benjamin Lesser et al., Special
Report: Local Governments ‘Overwhelmed’ in Race to Trace U.S. COVID Contacts, REUTERS
(Aug. 4, 2020, 7:16 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-tracing-specialrep/special-report-local-governments-overwhelmed-in-race-to-trace-u-s-covid-contactsidUSKCN2501GK.
4 Russell Brandom & Adi Robertson, Apple and Google Are Building a Coronavirus
Tracking System into iOS and Android, VERGE (Apr. 10, 2020, 12:58 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/4/10/21216484/google-apple-coronavirus-contract-tracing-bluetooth-location-tracking-data-app.
5 During oral argument for Carpenter v. United States, Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor commented on the dangers of unprotected metadata collection. When a cell phone
becomes “an appendage” for the individual (e.g., where people sleep with the phone in their
bed), the collection of contentless metadata in the aggregate, which includes location data,
reveals a substantial amount of information, comparable to the collection of content data.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 42-43, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (No.
16-402); see also Amy Davidson Sorkin, In Carpenter Case, Justice Sotomayor Tries to Picture the Smartphone Future, NEW YORKER (Nov. 30, 2017), https://perma.cc/RQ6P-PDHR.
6 The Stored Communications Act (SCA) was enacted as part of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) in 1986. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2701-13 (2018). By passing the ECPA, Congress closed the gaps in privacy protection for wire and electronic communications and transactional records because the Fourth
Amendment’s right to be “secure in [one’s] persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,” did not include electronic communications. U.S. CONST.
amend. IV.
7 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2210-11 (holding a warrant is required when police seek
cell phone tower data in connection with alleged criminal activity from a third-party).
8 “Expected” in this context means the population that was intended to be surveilled versus the one actually surveilled. For example, the USA PATRIOT Act was meant to “deter and
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Rather than surveillance policy that is outwardly aimed at allegedly suspect populations (e.g., terrorists9 or those affiliated with such), it can now
include all U.S. citizens at home or abroad, non-citizens in the country,
and others trying to enter the country. The current volume of users presents an unprecedented surveillance landscape. As of August 10, 2020,
Facebook had over 2.7 billion monthly active users.10 As of April 30,
2020, Google Chrome, a cross-platform web browser that saves everything a user does (e.g., search history, email content, location) to their
Google account, had over two billion users.11 The prevalence of thirdparty data platforms without any meaningful change in third-party data
laws has caused significant violations of individuals’ right to privacy—
and will continue to do so.12

punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world” by intercepting communications from “non-United States persons.” Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act
of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, pmbl., § 207, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) [hereinafter USA PATRIOT
Act] (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.); see also Glenn Greenwald & James
Ball, The Top Secret Rules that Allow NSA to Use US Data Without a Warrant, GUARDIAN
(June 20, 2013, 6:59 PM), https://perma.cc/BA8A-9SSC. In practice, the USA PATRIOT Act
was used to collect massive amounts of domestic communications from people with no connections to terrorist acts or groups. Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program
Taps in to User Data of Apple, Google and Others, GUARDIAN (June 7, 2013, 3:23 PM),
https://perma.cc/SK93-NT6R.
9 The author uses this term because it is the language of the post-9/11 surveillance laws
being discussed. This language has enabled significant anti-Muslim hatred, is used to dehumanize individuals in the name of national security, and will only be used in this Note as
necessary.
10 J. Clement, Facebook: Number of Monthly Active Users Worldwide 2008-2020,
STATISTA (Nov. 24, 2020), https://perma.cc/7UKQ-S4EH; see also Briana M. Trifiro & Jennifer Gerson, Social Media Usage Patterns: Research Note Regarding the Lack of Universal
Validated Measures for Active and Passive Use, SOC. MEDIA & SOC’Y, Apr.-June 2019, at 12, https://perma.cc/9YWZ-K6ZT (“[A]ctive social media usage refers to online behaviors that
facilitate ‘direct exchanges’ among users . . . . Active social use represents direct written communication between the user and their friends . . . .”).
11 Gordon Kelly, Google Chrome Crash Reports Grow with New Error Reports, FORBES
(last updated Apr. 30, 2020, 7:27 AM), https://perma.cc/XMN6-YDEU (stating a Chrome
software update was distributed on or around April 29, 2020, “to the browser’s two billion
users worldwide.”).
12 Since its passage in 1986, ECPA has not been amended to account for technological
advances. Modernizing the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), ACLU,
https://perma.cc/W87X-YHN4 (“Since 1986, technology has advanced at breakneck speed
while electronic privacy law remained at a standstill.”). Meanwhile, the SCA, Title II of the
ECPA, was minimally amended in 2018 to incorporate modern technology, with the Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act. Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data
Act, Pub. L. No. 115-141, div. V, §§ 101-06, 132 Stat. 348 (2018). The CLOUD Act allowed
federal law enforcement to compel U.S.-based tech companies to turn over data, regardless of
whether the data was stored domestically or abroad. Michael E. Lackey & Oral D. Pottinger,
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Applying the lessons learned from post-9/11 surveillance laws and
programs that created blanket searches of domestic communications in
the name of national security13 could be valuable as the United States
traverses this thicketed terrain. This Note will identify key takeaways
from the post-9/11 era and use them to contextualize surveillance practices during the COVID-19 pandemic. Part I discusses the post-9/11 legislation that broadened the government’s surveillance powers. Part II examines how the Trump administration responded to the COVID-19
outbreak. Both Parts I and II consider the types of data being sought and
the government agencies involved, along with the data collection methods
employed. Finally, Part III suggests some protective courses of action by
considering the fallout from the post-9/11 era of surveillance and its
abuses of individual privacy rights. While data surveillance will be an
integral tool in slowing the spread of COVID-19, the post-9/11 era has
shown the kinds of egregious personal violations that occur when government surveillance programs are allowed to act in secrecy and given unfettered deference.14
I. THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND THE BROADENED SCOPE OF
SURVEILLANCE
A. The Law and the NSA
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA)15 is a good
jumping-off point for a conversation about modern surveillance programs. FISA is an invention of the Cold War era and a response to extensive government surveillance that had been growing since the early 20th
century, as new technologies created public insecurity over the government’s reach into individuals’ lives.16 The Act provided the acceptable

Stored Communications Act: Practical Considerations, LEXISNEXIS (June 22, 2018),
https://perma.cc/9EKG-WX9Z.
13 See, e.g., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), Pub. L. No. 95-511,
92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.); Uniting and Strengthening
America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline Over Monitoring (USA
FREEDOM) Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268; USA PATRIOT Act.
14 Joseph Zeballos-Roig, 7 Ways that 9/11 Created a Dystopian Security Landscape that
Americans Are Still Living in, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 11, 2019, 2:34 PM), https://perma.cc/4QM
H-9KXY.
15 Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
16 For decades following World War II, “as part of its SHAMROCK [and MINARET]
Program[s], the government collected and turned over to the NSA millions of telegrams that
originated within, terminated in, or traveled through the United States.” G. Alex Sinha, NSA
Surveillance Since 9/11 and the Human Right to Privacy, 59 LOY. L. REV. 861, 869 (2003).
This coincided with the Red Scare—“paranoia about the internal Communist threat”—following World War II because of fears over the Soviet Union’s occupation of Eastern Europe.
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means for physical and electronic surveillance (e.g., wiretapping, access
to business records, pen registers), along with judicial and congressional
oversight of intelligence agencies.17
But these regulations were loose. For instance, while judicial authorization was required to spy on non-U.S. persons for more than three days,
spying could begin 72 hours before authorization was given.18 Moreover,
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), the court created under FISA, has a reputation of deferring to the National Security Agency’s
(NSA) judgment without much scrutiny.19 The court was also designed to
maintain secrecy for the sake of national security, offering little in the way
of accountability.20 FISC has no obligation to reveal court documents or
decisions about the warrants it approves.21
Initially, counter-terrorist initiatives following 9/11 were bipartisan,
helping legislation move quickly.22 Much of that support resulted from
the Bush administration harassing Congress with threats of potential future attacks.23 Attorney General John Ashcroft’s office began drafting
legislation to provide “access to [previously unavailable] legal tools in
order to more effectively combat terrorism.”24 These efforts culminated
McCarthyism and the Red Scare, U. VA. MILLER CTR., https://perma.cc/H9HP-EFVK (last
visited Aug. 29, 2020). Domestic espionage projects like MINARET and SHAMROCK were
driven by anti-communist sentiment from the White House and aimed at prominent figures,
such as Muhammad Ali and Martin Luther King, Jr., who were protesting the Vietnam War.
Matthew M. Aid & William Burr, Secret Cold War Documents Reveal NSA Spied on Senators,
FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 25, 2013, 8:30 PM), https://perma.cc/H6MY-WG9X.
17 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 §§ 102-03, 108.
18 50 U.S.C. § 1805(f)(1) (2020).
19 Between 1979 and 2012, “the court overseeing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act has rejected only 11 of the more than 33,900 surveillance applications by the government,
according to annual Justice Department reports to Congress.” Evan Perez, Secret Court’s
Oversight Gets Scrutiny, WALL ST. J. (June 9, 2013, 7:11 PM), https://perma.cc/48AH-NZQD.
20 5-4: Clapper v. Amnesty International, WESTWOOD ONE PODCAST NETWORK (May 12,
2020) (downloaded using Stitcher).
21 Id.
22 The 9/11 Commission was a bipartisan collection of lawmakers who probed into 9/11,
identified what kinds of “mistakes could be prevented in the future,” and created the 9/11
Commission Report. Sam Brodey, A Bipartisan Commission Came Together After 9/11. Don’t
Count on It for COVID-19., DAILY BEAST (Apr. 8, 2020, 6:56 AM), https://perma.cc/2D992BMK; see also Dara Lind, Everyone’s Heard of the Patriot Act. Here’s What It Actually
Does., VOX (June 2, 2015, 8:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/2015/6/2/8701499/patriot-act-explain; Peter P. Swire, Privacy and Information Sharing in the War on Terrorism, 51 VILL. L.
REV. 951, 951-52 (2006).
23 See generally Surveillance Under the USA/Patriot Act, ACLU, https://perma.cc/FRH9XKDN (last visited Dec. 29, 2020).
24 Joshua H. Pike, The Impact of a Knee-Jerk Reaction: The Patriot Act Amendments to
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and the Ability of One Word to Erase Established
Constitutional Requirements, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 185, 211 (2007) (citing JOHN ASHCROFT,
NEVER AGAIN: SECURING AMERICA AND RESTORING JUSTICE 154 (2006)). “[S]uch legal tools

40

CUNY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:35

in the USA PATRIOT Act, signed into law by George W. Bush on October 26, 2001, about a month and a half after 9/11.25 Since its enactment,
not only has the USA PATRIOT Act become synonymous with broad
governmental powers of surveillance, it also expanded other executive
powers, like detention powers and the authority to generate funding for
counter-terrorism.26 Some key, surveillance-specific provisions of the
USA PATRIOT Act are27: section 215 (third-party records searches);28
section 213 (private property searches without owner’s notice);29 section
218 (expanding the Fourth Amendment’s exception to collection of foreign intelligence information);30 section 214 (surveilling “foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person”);31 and the National Security Letters Provision (“expand[ing] the FBI’s authority to
demand personal customer records from Internet Service Providers . . .
without prior court approval”).32 Section 215—along with the rarely-used
sections 20633 and 20734—were temporary provisions that were set to (and
did) sunset in 2015.35
FISA was amended by the USA PATRIOT Act under Title II, Section 218.36 Originally, FISA contained an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause requirement: Wiretapping or general searches

included amending the legal standard for acquiring a FISA order and the degree of permissible
communications between criminal prosecutors and foreign intelligence agents.” Id. at 210
n.126 (citing ASHCROFT, supra, at 156).
25 See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
26 See Lind, supra note 22.
27 For summaries of the following sections, see Surveillance Under the USA/Patriot Act,
supra note 23.
28 USA PATRIOT Act § 215. Section 215 sunsetted on March 15, 2020. India McKinney,
Section 215 Expired: Year in Review 2020, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 29, 2020),
https://perma.cc/ZYE2-YYCH.
29 USA PATRIOT Act § 213.
30 Id. § 218.
31 Id. § 214.
32 National Security Letters, ACLU, https://perma.cc/U96D-FL36 (last visited Dec. 29,
2020).
33 The “roving wiretap” provision is where a wiretap follows an individual. See USA
PATRIOT Act § 206.
34 The “lone wolf” provision is where the government has “probable cause” to surveil a
target but cannot show the target’s link to a foreign terrorist organization or foreign power.
USA PATRIOT Act § 207; see also 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1)(C); Robert Chesney, Why Is the
Lone Wolf FISA Provision Never Used? And Just How Broad Is the FISC Understanding of
Group Agency?, LAWFARE (June 3, 2015, 2:13 PM), https://perma.cc/BKA9-PKPY.
35 Lind, supra note 22; McKinney, supra note 28.
36 USA PATRIOT Act § 218.
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could occur “only if the primary purpose was to gather foreign intelligence.”37 Section 218 changed the “primary purpose” requirement of foreign intelligence-gathering to a “significant purpose” requirement, loosening the evidentiary standard.38 Changing to the “significant purpose”
standard allowed the government to “circumvent the traditional warrant
requirements of the Fourth Amendment,”39 even if the primary purpose
was to gather criminal evidence.40
Before FISA and the USA PATRIOT Act, the NSA, a government
intelligence agency, engaged in domestic surveillance for decades.41 The
NSA had projects like SHAMROCK that intercepted telegraphic data
(e.g., telegrams) entering and exiting the United States.42 Its sister project,
MINARET, involved intercepting domestic electronic communications
and transmitting them to other federal intelligence agencies, like the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA).43 ThinThread, designed by William Binney, Ed Loomis, and J.
Kirk Wiebe,44 was a program from the 1990s that enhanced wiretapping
by providing the architecture to analyze the vast amount of data the NSA
was collecting and then dump irrelevant data to comply with Fourth
Amendment warrantless search and seizure rights.45 Three weeks prior to
9/11, ThinThread was sidelined by Trailblazer, an essentially identical,

37

Surveillance Under the USA/Patriot Act, supra note 23 (emphasis added).
Pike, supra note 24 (“Section 218 . . . amended 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) of FISA to
require the significant purpose of a FISA order be for foreign intelligence, rather than the
previously required primary purpose or purpose requirement.”); Jennifer L. Sullivan, From
the Purpose to a Significant Purpose: Assessing the Constitutionality of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Under the Fourth Amendment, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y 379, 381 (2005) (“While authorization for a FISA court order traditionally entailed
certification that ‘the purpose’ of the surveillance was to acquire foreign intelligence, section
218 allows the FISA court to issue a FISA warrant if ‘a significant purpose’ of the investigation is foreign intelligence surveillance.”) (footnotes omitted).
39 Sullivan, supra note 38, at 412.
40 Pike, supra note 24.
41 NSA Timeline 1791-2015, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://perma.cc/QKS8-548G.
42 S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 765 (1976).
43 See Lisa Graves, The Right to Privacy in Light of Presidents’ Programs: What Project
MINARET’s Admissions Reveal About Modern Surveillance of Americans, 88 TEX. L. REV.
1855, 1879-80 (2010).
44 ThinThread Whistleblowers, GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT (May 7, 2020),
https://perma.cc/5EQZ-VUKA.
45 Patrick G. Eddington, Hayden, NSA, and the Road to 9/11, JUST SECURITY (Dec. 7,
2017), https://perma.cc/7W6K-8XJ3.
38
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though exorbitantly more flawed, project46 that, notably, lacked Fourth
Amendment protections.47
After 9/11 and the USA PATRIOT Act’s enactment—and following
an executive order from George W. Bush48—the NSA implemented the
Terrorist Surveillance Program, which enabled the comprehensive, warrantless seizure of electronic data (e.g., interception of phone conversations and private e-mails).49 Oversight was more relaxed under the Terrorist Surveillance Program than it had been under FISA. Rather than
limit surveillance target decision-making to senior staff members, under
the Terrorist Surveillance Program “targets . . . may be chosen by the ‘operational work force’ at the NSA and approved by a shift supervisor.”50
And while the Terrorist Surveillance Program ended in 2007, it paved the
way for other programs like PRISM, OAKSTAR, and STORMBREW,
which allowed the NSA—so long as it received FISC’s blessing—to conduct dragnet searches of data from users of private internet service providers.51 These programs were created under the Protect America Act of

46 By the time it was abandoned in 2006, Trailblazer had cost the government $1.2 billion
and “stalled at the level of schematic drawings . . . .” Jane Mayer, The Secret Sharer, NEW
YORKER (May 23, 2011), https://perma.cc/BL3P-ZW63; see also Tim Shorrock, Obama’s
Crackdown on Whistleblowers, NATION (Mar. 26, 2013), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/obamas-crackdown-whistleblowers/; Eddington, supra note 45.
47 Rather than segregate, encrypt, and discard unnecessary communications like ThinThread did, Trailblazer “was about ingesting signals, identifying and sorting them, storing
what was important, and then quickly retrieving data in response to queries.” Eddington, supra
note 45 (quoting MICHAEL V. HAYDEN, PLAYING TO THE EDGE: AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE IN
THE AGE OF TERROR 20 (2017)). This kind of data seizure and storage by the government violates the Fourth Amendment’s right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure in the
absence of a warrant and probable cause. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
48 Sinha, supra note 16, at 864.
49 Id. at 888 (“[T]he NSA had ‘intercepted private e-mail messages and phone calls of
Americans in recent months on a scale that went beyond the broad legal limits established by
Congress . . . .’”) (quoting Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Officials Say U.S. Wiretaps Exceeded Law, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2009)), https://perma.cc/63UY-STSM. Sinha stated they
used the term “NSA program” in their article to refer to what was publicly known as the “Terrorist Surveillance Program” and, internally at the NSA, as “Operation Stellar Wind.” Id. at
876 n.79.
50 Katherine Wong, The NSA Terrorist Surveillance Program, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 517,
519 (2006).
51 See Letter from Attorney Gen. Alberto R. Gonzales to Senators Patrick Leahy and Arlen Specter (Jan. 17, 2007), https://perma.cc/V8G4-69M6; NSA Timeline 1791-2015, supra
note 41; T.C. Sottek & Janus Kopfstein, Everything You Need to Know About PRISM, VERGE
(July 17, 2013, 1:36 PM), https://perma.cc/357Q-YX47; Sam Biddle, The NSA Worked to
“Track Down” Bitcoin Users, Snowden Documents Reveal, INTERCEPT (Mar. 20, 2018, 11:22
AM), https://perma.cc/7K5Z-YPW5; Newly Disclosed N.S.A. Files Detail Partnerships with
AT&T and Verizon, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2015), https://perma.cc/ZES4-XB6P.
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2007,52 which decimated protections for U.S. persons by allowing warrantless surveillance of communications, so long as the communication
was “directed at” someone overseas.53
A year later, Congress passed the FISA Amendments Act of 2008.54
Constitutional rights advocates like the ACLU warned that these amendments continued to facilitate data-collection abuses against Americans.55
The amendments broadened presidential powers by allowing mass spying
of communications without requiring that targets had connections to terrorist activities or organizations;56 restricted judicial oversight by allowing programs denied by FISC to continue;57 and provided “retroactive immunity to the telecommunications companies for their role in the
president’s domestic spying program.”58 This immediately worried
groups of lawyers, journalists, and human rights organizations like the
ACLU and Amnesty International, which were concerned their communications with persons overseas would be intercepted. These groups
claimed they would need to take extra precautions to protect their overseas communications with those who would be considered suspect under
these amendments and filed a lawsuit in federal court to enjoin enforcement of the amendments and hold them to be facially unconstitutional.59
But rather than make a determination on the substance of the FISA
amendments, the Supreme Court held that Amnesty International did not
have a sufficient case in controversy for standing because its alleged harm
was too speculative.60 The dissent, however, considered the alleged
“speculative” injuries to be injuries in fact.61

52

Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552.
See Sottek & Kopfstein, supra note 51; ACLU Analysis of the Protect America Act,
ACLU, https://perma.cc/N2AY-8QBZ (last visited Sept. 29, 2020).
54 FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436.
55 See
Talking Points on the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, ACLU,
https://perma.cc/E4YF-3Z4E (last visited Sept. 29, 2020).
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 568 U.S. 398, 406-07 (2013) (“Respondents also assert that
they ‘have ceased engaging’ in certain telephone and e-mail conversations. According to respondents, the threat of surveillance will compel them to travel abroad in order to have inperson conversations. In addition, respondents declare that they have undertaken ‘costly and
burdensome measures’ to protect the confidentiality of sensitive communications.”) (citations
omitted).
60 Id. at 402 (“[R]espondents cannot manufacture standing by choosing to make expenditures based on hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending.”).
61 Id. at 422, 431, 441 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
53
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B. The Wave of Backlash Comes Crashing Down
While much of the USA PATRIOT Act has received heavy criticism,62 section 215—pertaining to the acquisition of business records—
has been particularly controversial.63 The constitutional right to privacy,
specifically under the Fourth Amendment, considers whether an individual has a reasonable expectation to privacy; the reasonableness decreases
as the individual moves farther away from the home.64 The third-party
doctrine—the principle that there is no reasonable expectation to privacy
when one voluntarily provides information to a third party—bolsters the
argument that seizing third-party documents does not violate any individual’s right to privacy.65 Supreme Court jurisprudence on the legality of
bulk data collection, while considerate of the role technology plays in privacy, “does not provide a clear legal standard for when the Fourth
Amendment applies to data shared with a third party . . . .”66
The combination of a sprawling data landscape, with underdeveloped legislative protection and minimal judicial oversight,67 has allowed
for the NSA’s “dragnet surveillance of the domestic communications”
that have connections to overseas terrorist activity.68 A New York Times
article from 2005 brought attention to the Terrorist Surveillance Program’s “captur[ing] what are purely domestic communications in some
cases, despite a requirement . . . that one end of the intercepted conversations take place on foreign soil . . . .”69 In 2013, Edward Snowden

62

See, e.g., Lind, supra note 22; Surveillance Under the USA/Patriot Act, supra note 23.
See generally Pike, supra note 24.
63 See e.g., Lind, supra note 22.
64 Note, If These Walls Could Talk: The Smart Home and the Fourth Amendment Limits
of the Third Party Doctrine, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1924, 1926-27 (2017).
65 Id. at 1928-29.
66 Sharon Bradford Franklin, Carpenter and the End of Bulk Surveillance of Americans,
LAWFARE (July 25, 2018, 11:36 AM), https://perma.cc/QRS9-7BHR. See also Carpenter v.
United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220-21 (2018) (holding a warrant is required when police
seek cell phone tower data in connection with alleged criminal activity from a third-party);
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012) (holding that installing a GPS device in the
defendant’s car without a warrant constituted an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment).
67 See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, U.S. SURVEILLANCE: UNCHECKED AND UNSUPERVISED
(2013), https://perma.cc/L7U7-EW6C.
68 NSA Spying, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://perma.cc/7YGM-YH6Q (last visited
Nov. 8, 2020).
69 James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Spying Program Snared U.S. Calls, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
21, 2005), https://perma.cc/7HE6-BGT9.
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leaked70 a court order directed at Verizon that exposed how extensive the
NSA’s surveillance program was.71 PRISM was exposed as being an NSA
and FBI tool used to grab data directly from private online service providers, like “Microsoft, Google, Apple, Yahoo, and others.”72
Under the FISA Amendments Act, provisions like section 70273 enabled backdoor programs like PRISM to exist for the purpose of collecting e-mails, phone data, and other telecommunications for foreign intelligence.74 Acting under section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, the NSA
“collected the telephone records from millions of Verizon customers,” according to one of the revelations from the Snowden leaks.75 The Privacy
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, an independent government agency,
was enacted to analyze the executive branch’s anti-terrorism decisions
and ensure the consideration of individual liberties in those decisions.76
In a 2014 review, the Board found the telephone surveillance programs
provided no direct contribution “to the discovery of a previously unknown
terrorist plot or the disruption of a terrorist attack.”77
In 2015, responding to the backlash, Congress passed—and President Obama signed—the Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline Over Monitoring Act

70 While the Snowden leaks were not the first to expose the government’s domestic spying, his revelations were the culmination of outdated privacy laws combined with the increased technological capabilities of government spying. See John Cassidy, Snowden’s Legacy: A Public Debate About Online Privacy, NEW YORKER (Aug. 20, 2013), https://perma.cc
/53J2-BAE6.
71 See Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily, GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013, 6:05 AM), https://perma.cc/G6DC-4RCR (describing an
order from the NSA requiring Verizon to provide the agency with information on all telephone
calls in Verizon’s systems on an “ongoing, daily basis.”).
72 Sottek & Kopfstein, supra note 51.
73 FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 702, 122 Stat. 2436.
74 See
Decoding 702: What Is Section 702?, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.,
https://perma.cc/9KHX-DKLV (last visited Sept. 19, 2020); see also ‘Incidental,’ Not Accidental, Collection, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://perma.cc/PY9G-ZBVH (last visited Dec.
14, 2020).
75 Greenwald, supra note 71; see also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S USE OF SECTION 215 ORDERS FOR BUSINESS RECORDS IN 2012
THROUGH 2014 (2016), https://perma.cc/39BW-8BQ6; Paul Szoldra, This Is Everything Edward Snowden Revealed in One Year of Unprecedented Top-Secret Leaks, BUS. INSIDER (Sept.
16, 2016, 8:00 AM), https://perma.cc/HGP4-XRAX.
76 History and Mission, PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., https://perma.cc/6C
NU-NWBV (last visited Dec. 29, 2020).
77 DAVID MEDINE ET AL., PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE
TELEPHONE RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT
AND ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 11 (2014),
https://perma.cc/S4ET-TLGF.
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(“USA FREEDOM Act” or “Freedom Act”).78 After some of the USA
PATRIOT Act’s more controversial provisions (e.g., section 215) had
sunsetted, the Freedom Act brought them back with narrower requirements for the NSA to follow.79 For instance, under the Freedom Act, the
government must obtain permission from FISC before requesting communications records; additionally, the government cannot engage in bulk
data grabs and is instead limited to specific search requests.80 The Freedom Act also reined in the National Security Letters provision, essentially
giving it the same restrictions that section 215 received.81 In practice,
though, these restrictions did not significantly affect the government’s
abilities to request bulk metadata.82 And under the Freedom Act, these
provisions were set to expire in December 2019; however, they have been
reauthorized as recently as March 2020.83 In fact, the latest decision to
allow these provisions to stay intact came during the beginning of the
COVID-19 lockdowns in the United States, on March 16, 2020.84
II. NATIONAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC HEALTH SURVEILLANCE DURING
COVID-19
The United States got its first confirmed case of the novel coronavirus on January 21, 2020.85 On February 26, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) identified the first U.S. case of COVID-19
where the patient had neither traveled to an outbreak area nor had a history
of contact with an infected person.86 While west coast states (e.g., Washington, California) were the first to attract national attention, it quickly
78

USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268.
Lind, supra note 22.
80 Id. (“The USA Freedom Act would force the government to ask the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court for approval before being able to access phone records, and would
only give it access for specific searches—not just passive bulk collection of everyone’s data.”).
81 Id. (“[T]he government couldn’t use the letters to get data they were banned from getting through the courts.”)
82 See Sharon Bradford Franklin, Fulfilling the Promise of the USA Freedom Act: Time
to Truly End Bulk Collection of Americans’ Calling Records, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 28, 2019),
https://perma.cc/4V8B-W3RN (“But even with the [telecommunications providers rather than
the government] holding the data and conducting the queries, the replacement [call detail records] program still permits the government to collect vast amounts of data . . . .”).
83 See Franklin, supra note 82; India McKinney, House Lawmakers Extend Section 215
into Next Year Even Though They Had Years to Stop Illegal Overcollection of Americans’
Sensitive Data, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 19, 2019), https://perma.cc/6JH3-32LR; Margaret Taylor, What Happened to FISA Reform?, LAWFARE (Mar. 17, 2020, 3:06 PM), https://
perma.cc/5VQ4-5CRR.
84 Taylor, supra note 83.
85 Erin Schumaker, Timeline: How Coronavirus Got Started, ABC NEWS (Sept. 22, 2020,
11:55 AM), https://perma.cc/QTM7-RXFE.
86 Id.
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shifted to New York, the epicenter of the U.S. outbreak.87 This attentionshifting moved to the southern and midwestern United States as different
states enacted varying levels of re-openings.88 Former President Donald
Trump declared a national emergency on March 13, 2020.89 Not long after, the federal government sought broader powers during this state of
emergency. For instance, only eight days after then-President Trump’s
emergency declaration, the Department of Justice requested the ability to
“detain people indefinitely without trial during emergencies.”90
A. Background on the Data Changes Since 9/11
Before delving into COVID-19 data surveillance, it is important to
establish the data scene that currently exists, as compared to what existed
post-9/11. The kind of technology that existed immediately following
9/11 was generally limited.91 The percentage of U.S. adults who own cell
phones has jumped from 62% in 2002 to 96% in 2019.92 Smartphones,
which actively and passively connect to the internet, have vastly increased
the volume of data—specifically location data—on individual users.93
Legislation for electronic communications has existed since the
1980s but does not meet the needs of our present data-scape. Section
2703(d) of the Stored Communications Act, a law governing the voluntary and compelled disclosure of electronic communications held by
third-party service providers, requires only that non-content information
be “relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation”—a lower
standard than a warrant requires—to compel production.94 Jurisprudence
has been underdeveloped as well. It was not until 2018, in Carpenter v.

87

Id.
See Lauren Aratani, South and West Drive Record-Breaking Surge in Coronavirus
Cases Across US, GUARDIAN (July 11, 2020, 2:08 PM), https://perma.cc/6BAA-S53M; see
also Reed Abelson, et al., The Midwest Sees a Spike as Covid-19 Cases Decline Elsewhere,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2020), https://perma.cc/VE5K-26XY.
89 Proclamation on Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Novel Coronavirus
Disease (COVID-19) Outbreak, WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 13, 2020), https://perma.cc/D84N7LTH.
90 Betsy Woodruff Swan, DOJ Seeks New Emergency Powers amid Coronavirus Pandemic, POLITICO (Mar. 21, 2020, 1:01 PM), https://perma.cc/S6JQ-Q8SA.
91 See World Wide Web Timeline, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 11, 2014), https://perma.cc/5N5RJBU6.
92 Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (June 12, 2019), https://perma.cc/AAB2-DMYY.
93 See Stuart A. Thompson & Charlie Warzel, Smartphones Are Spies. Here’s Whom They
Report to., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2019), https://perma.cc/DT6H-TG7R.
94 Sabrina McCubbin, Summary: The Supreme Court Rules in Carpenter v. United States,
LAWFARE (June 22, 2018, 2:05 PM) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2018)), https://perma.cc/
8QY9-H3B4.
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United States, that the Supreme Court held a warrant was required to obtain aggregated cell-site location information (CSLI) from a third party
during a criminal investigation.95
With shockingly little privacy precedent regarding aggregated cell
phone location metadata combined with an unprecedented global health
crisis, it is hard to predict the boundaries of future surveillance policy.
Relaxed privacy standards that exist generally for third-party data collection compounded with a national crisis, where third-party data collection
is necessary to stem the crisis, lead to the conclusion that those standards
will only be further relaxed.96
Public health surveillance also uses big data, a practice that had been
going on prior to the pandemic.97 Among the goals of public health surveillance are “outbreak investigation, identifying newborns who need essential medical care, and research.”98 As heart disease and cancer started
killing more people in the U.S. than infectious diseases, public health surveillance expanded beyond preventing infectious diseases and began
identifying factors that cause chronic illnesses.99 Public health surveillance now looks deeper into an individual’s medical history to find genetic, behavioral, and environmental factors that could lead to chronic illness, rather than looking at surface symptoms connected to infectious
diseases.100 This bears likeness to the NSA’s data collecting methodologies, as it also sweeps up large swathes of information.101
B. What Does Surveillance During the COVID-19 Pandemic Look Like?
Akin to how the NSA was central to anti-terrorism surveillance, the
current pandemic requires the involvement of the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) for data collection. The CDC, an
agency within HHS, has stressed the importance of surveillance—coupled with shelter-in-place policies—to control and limit the spread of
95

138 S. Ct. 2206, 2210-11 (2018).
See Joel, supra note 1; see also Swire, supra note 2.
97 Public Health Surveillance: Preparing for the Future, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION 7-11, 29-36 (2018), https://perma.cc/4B6Y-SZ8K.
98 Wendy K. Mariner, Mission Creep: Public Health Surveillance and Medical Privacy,
87 B.U. L. REV. 347, 351 (2007).
99 Id. at 353-54 (“Today, surveillance programs exist for a variety of cancers, genetic conditions of newborns, and occupational diseases, as well as other health-related events like immunizations, injuries, and adverse drug reactions.”).
100 Id. at 354.
101 Id. at 354-55 (“Case reporting is only one method of data collection. Other methods
include population surveys, medical record reviews, and epidemiological and behavioral research studies aimed at determining the distribution, incidence, and causation of diseases
across locations and populations, as well as the effects of prevention and treatment interventions.”)
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COVID-19.102 History, too, holds examples of disease surveillance methods—albeit rudimentary ones—during pandemics. During the 1918 Spanish flu pandemic, white scarves tied on doors were used to identify which
houses had people with infections;103 and in 1854, John Snow’s cholera
map tracked the disease’s progress, laying the groundwork for how we do
the same today.104 Though technology has changed, epidemiological surveillance (i.e., “the systematic collection, analysis, interpretation and
timely dissemination of health data for the planning, implementation and
evaluation of public health program[s]”)105 remains critically important to
containing a disease.106
The post-9/11 era also utilized public health surveillance out of fear
that a second wave of bioterrorist activity might occur.107 Deaths resulting
from anthrax mailed in letters108—as well as avian influenza109 and the
SARS epidemic110 that soon followed—created anxiety that fueled the
CDC’s drafting of model legislation for mandatory disease reporting (e.g.,
the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act).111 The CDC also proposed an increase in funding for federal bioterrorism grants to create surveillance programs.112 Collection methods generally included case-reporting, population surveys, medical records reviews, and

102 See e.g., Press Release, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, CDC Launches New
Weekly COVID-19 Surveillance Report (Apr. 3, 2020), https://perma.cc/8JL2-JW86.
103 Julie Unruh, Chicago Woman Shares Her Grandmother’s Experience with the 1918
Spanish Flu, WGNTV (Apr. 21, 2020, 10:35 PM), https://perma.cc/DJS5-GPJ5.
104 Simon Rogers, John Snow’s Data Journalism: The Cholera Map that Changed the
World, GUARDIAN (Mar. 15, 2013, 5:30 AM), https://perma.cc/3J9H-DKE2.
105 Steven B. Thacker et al., A Method for Evaluating Systems of Epidemiological Surveillance, 41 WORLD HEALTH STAT. Q. 11, 15 (1998), https://perma.cc/VDC3-MMTW.
106 Mariner, supra note 98, at 361 (“Investigators needed to know within hours or days
that highly contagious diseases . . . had been diagnosed in order to find the source of infection
and investigate whether and where it might have spread. Only with quick access to such information could they protect others from imminent infection.”).
107 Id. at 356-57.
108 Timeline: How the Anthrax Terror Unfolded, NPR (Feb. 15, 2011, 11:00 AM),
https://perma.cc/9CDV-3FH6.
109 Mariner, supra note 98, at 356.
110 Id.
111 Also known as MSEHPA, the draft legislation “increase[s] state powers to respond to
bioterrorism or other outbreaks of disease that the [CDC] and others want the states to pass
into law.” Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, ACLU, https://perma.cc/F2QU-JG37
(last visited Nov. 7, 2020).
112 Mariner, supra note 98, at 356-57.
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epidemiological research.113 While public health surveillance for purposes of national security is not a new concept, it will utilize the thirdparty, private internet industry in a unique way.114
Like the NSA did through its surveillance programs, the government
is contracting with third-party software companies to do the tracing.115
Contracting with private, third-party internet service providers allows for
lower government regulation.116 It also means the type of data being
sought is considered “business records” (much like the post-9/11 surveillance era),117 which provides greater ease of access to government officials.118
Before Google and Apple’s contract to create contact tracing technology, Google’s sister company, Verily, and its Project Baseline were
touted by then-President Trump as a “front line player in the fight against
a global pandemic.”119 The Baseline COVID-19 Program was developed
“under the direction of the California Department of Public Health.”120 At
the outset, users create a profile, take an online screener, and, if eligible,
are directed to a testing site.121 The Project Baseline website makes no
mention of temporality when it discusses the storage of users’ health data;
but it acknowledges that a range of information provided by users (e.g.,
name, address, phone number, survey responses) may be disseminated to
“third parties” (e.g., contractors, public health authorities, Google) and
113

Id. at 354-55.
See generally Brandom & Robertson, supra note 4 (discussing the creation of new
technology for the purpose of aiding the government in collecting mass metadata and health
data that is disseminated to individuals via their smartphones).
115 Id.
116 The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), a European data protection law, has
shown how loose U.S. data protection law is regarding the private sector, as demonstrated by
the U.S.’s struggles to comply with the E.U.’s higher standards for data protection. See Vincent Manancourt, EU Court Ruling Strikes Hammer Blow to Transatlantic Data Flows,
POLITICO (July 16, 2020, 1:19 PM), https://perma.cc/ZKY3-CWLA. The U.S.’s laxer treatment of data protection has resulted in “European regulators . . . increasingly speaking out in
favor of keeping data stored inside the bloc.” Vincent Manancourt, Demise of Privacy Shield
May Be the End of U.S.-Europe Data Transfers, POLITICO (Aug. 4, 2020, 11:34 PM),
https://perma.cc/N25U-VE6D.
117 Greenwald, supra note 71.
118 See Lind, supra note 22 (discussing Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, the “business records” provision).
119 Douglas MacMillan et al., Trump Announced Google Was Building a Virus Screening
Tool. Then Someone Had to Build It, WASH. POST (Mar. 16, 2020, 10:09 PM),
https://perma.cc/E6RS-Y3W9. See also Baseline COVID-19 Testing Program, PROJECT
BASELINE BY VERILY, https://perma.cc/2ERG-59HK (last visited Nov. 7, 2020).
120 What Is the Baseline COVID-19 Program?, COVID-19 FAQ, PROJECT BASELINE BY
VERILY, https://perma.cc/D9GS-63PR (last visited Nov. 7, 2020).
121 How Do I Get Tested?, COVID-19 FAQ, PROJECT BASELINE BY VERILY,
https://perma.cc/D9GS-63PR (last visited Nov. 7, 2020).
114

2021] 9/11 SURVEILLANCE AND COVID-19 CONTACT TRACING 51
that Google’s access to user data will be “limited to the purpose of providing [protective storage] services.”122 Soon after Verily launched, it had
issues with reaching site capacity,123 preventing users from scheduling
testing appointments.124 The survey Verily used also behaved unexpectedly after users responded to a question about whether they were experiencing symptoms and “caused confusion among people trying to use the
site.”125 Furthermore, Verily required that its users create a Google profile
before using its site, which added to the insecurity over privacy protections for user health data.126 These issues, resulting from a website created
in a rush to meet the promises made by former President Trump, made it
“more clear than ever that the website Trump described is not what the
American public will use to find coronavirus testing.”127
Like the way the government compelled and contracted with private
entities like Verizon and AT&T for surveillance under the USA
PATRIOT Act,128 the government is now contracting with software corporations, like Google, Apple, and Facebook.129 Google and Apple made
smartphone technology that relies on the voluntary input of a positive
COVID-19 diagnosis.130 The tech uses Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE)
122 Who Will My Data Be Shared With?, COVID-19 FAQ, PROJECT BASELINE BY VERILY
(last visited Nov. 7, 2020) https://perma.cc/D9GS-63PR.
123 “In the context of networks, capacity is the complex measurement of the maximum
amount of data that may be transferred between network locations over a link or network
path.” Capacity, TECHOPEDIA, https://perma.cc/8YL5-7XGB (last visited Aug. 30, 2020).
124 Daisuke Wakabayashi & Natasha Singer, Coronavirus Testing Website Goes Live and
Quickly Hits Capacity, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2020), https://perma.cc/25XL-Z9PL.
125 Id. (describing how users who responded “yes” to the question about experiencing
symptoms found the site abruptly ended the survey, while those responding “no” were asked
further questions about their “age, location and other factors”).
126 Id. (“Verily is rolling out its virus-screening tool at a moment when its parent company,
Google, is facing intense scrutiny for it[s] push to acquire and analyze health data. A group of
U.S. senators is looking into a deal that Google made with Ascension, the nation’s secondlargest hospital system, which gave the tech giant access to millions of medical records without patients’ explicit knowledge or consent.”) (first citing Ed Pilkington, Warren and Group
of Senators Demand Google Answer How It Will Use Medical Data, GUARDIAN (Nov. 21,
2019, 10:39 AM), https://perma.cc/7WMU-DAH2; and then citing Natasha Singer & Daisuke
Wakabayashi, Google to Store and Analyze Millions of Health Records, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11,
2019), https://perma.cc/A76M-F9VR).
127 Adam Clark Estes, The Google and Verily Coronavirus Websites Are Off to a Rocky
Start, VOX: RECODE (Mar. 23, 2020, 1:10 PM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/3/15/2118
0518/coronavirus-google-verily-website-testing-trump.
128 Sottek & Kopfstein, supra note 51; Greenwald, supra note 71; Brendan Sasso, Judge:
Patriot Act Snooping Was Accepted by Phone Companies, HILL (July 30, 2013, 2:29 PM),
https://perma.cc/V2WC-7XKU.
129 Brandom & Robertson, supra note 4.
130 See Kari Paul, Apple and Google Release Phone Technology to Notify Users of Coronavirus Exposure, GUARDIAN (May 20, 2020, 6:51 PM), https://perma.cc/MQB8-6W6T
(“‘User adoption is key to success and we believe that these strong privacy protections are
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transmissions to track user proximities without tracking their specific location in the way GPS data does.131 In short, the technology:
[P]ick[s] up the signals of nearby phones at 5-minute intervals and
store[s] the connections between them in a database. If one person
tests positive for the novel coronavirus, they could tell the app
they’ve been infected, and it could notify other people whose
phones passed within close range in the preceding days.132
The tech, released in May 2020, already has buy-in: “[Twenty-two]
countries and several US states are already planning to build voluntary
phone apps using their software.”133 Facebook has also rolled out an interactive COVID-19 map to show how many people have reported symptoms in one’s county.134 Facebook’s data comes from a survey of over
one million users that was conducted by Carnegie Mellon University researchers.135
Other countries have versions of these apps with varying pipelines
to their respective governments. In China’s fight against the disease’s second wave, its government began tracking citizens by sorting their personal
data “into color-coded categories . . . corresponding to their health . . . .”136
In Singapore, the Trace Together app keeps a register of all individual
users’ contacts and informs any contact who has been in proximity of that
user within two weeks if that user tests positive for COVID-19.137 Israel
is also directly tracking location data on citizens’ cell phones.138
C. Emerging Criticisms
Ultimately, contact tracing may prove to be an untrustworthy form
of metadata surveillance. The kind of BLE technology the apps use to

also the best way to encourage use of these apps,’ [Apple and Google] said in a joint statement . . . .”).
131 See Brandom & Robertson, supra note 4.
132 Id.
133 Paul, supra note 130.
134 See Aaron Holmes, Facebook Just Released an Interactive COVID-19 Map that Shows
How Many People Are Reporting Symptoms in Your Area, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 20, 2020, 10:06
AM), https://perma.cc/RL6W-7YEF.
135 Id.
136 See Ali Dukakis, China Rolls Out Software Surveillance for the COVID-19 Pandemic,
Alarming Human Rights Advocates, ABC NEWS (Apr. 14, 2020, 6:30 AM), https://perma.cc
/FV5W-QNMP.
137 Andrew Crocker et al., The Challenge of Proximity Apps for COVID-19 Contact Tracing, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 10, 2020), https://perma.cc/4QQZ-724L.
138 David M. Halbfinger et al., To Track Coronavirus, Israel Moves to Tap Secret Trove
of Cellphone Data, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2020), https://perma.cc/JH3Q-GYLP.
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conduct contact tracing has not proven reliable.139 Nuances of contact will
be lost—likely increasing false positives—because tracing proximity
through Bluetooth does not consider factors like duration (i.e., how long
people are in contact with one another) or spatial considerations besides
distance (i.e., whether users are in different rooms but still close enough
for their phones to register each other’s location).140 The apps also require
voluntary compliance, which makes their potential for accuracy unreliable.141
Policies regulating health-data privacy also create issues of consent.
HHS’s first response to COVID-19 was to adjust its regulations under the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) to accommodate surveillance programs.142 The Clinton administration enacted
HIPAA to regulate insurance coverage,143 reduce healthcare fraud and
abuse,144 and mandate confidentiality for protected healthcare data,145
among other things. Customarily, a patient’s written authorization is required for Public Health Information (PHI) to be disclosed by a covered
entity, except when disclosure is required in narrow circumstances.146
Alex Azar, the former Secretary of HHS, relaxed certain privacy provisions under HIPAA.147 For instance, patient consent is no longer required
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See Brandom & Robertson, supra note 4.
Id.
141 “The first problem . . . is getting a meaningful number of people to install the app and
make sure it’s active as everyone makes their way through the world. Most countries have
made app installation voluntary, and adoption has been low. In Singapore . . . adoption has
been about 12 percent of the population. If the United States had similar adoption, you’ve now
made your big contact-tracing bet on the likelihood that two people passing one another have
both installed this app on your phone. The statistical likelihood of this is about 1.44 percent.
(It could be higher in areas with greater population density or where the app was more widely
installed.).” Casey Newton, Why Bluetooth Apps Are Bad at Discovering New Cases of
COVID-19, VERGE (Apr. 10, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/interface/2020/4/
10/21215267/covid-19-contact-tracing-apps-bluetooth-coronavirus-flaws-public-health.
142 See Heather F. Delgado et al., Relaxing of HIPAA Laws During COVID-19 Pandemic,
NAT’L L. REV. (Mar. 18, 2020), https://perma.cc/LQH6-U9NG.
143 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
§§ 102, 111, 110 Stat. 1936.
144 Id. §§ 201-50.
145 Id. § 264.
146 Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
https://perma.cc/MH7Y-7KAB (last updated July 26, 2013) (“A major purpose of the Privacy
Rule is to define and limit the circumstances in which an individual’s protected heath information may be used or disclosed by covered entities. A covered entity may not use or disclose
protected health information, except either: (1) as the Privacy Rule permits or requires; or (2)
as the individual who is the subject of the information (or the individual’s personal representative) authorizes in writing.”).
147 Delgado et al., supra note 142 (explaining Secretary Azar’s “limited waiver” of the
HIPAA Privacy Rule).
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in certain circumstances if the release of that information is necessary.148
What is considered “necessary”—much like what was considered “significant” under the USA PATRIOT Act—can be subject to broad interpretation.149
Republican Senators Roger Wicker (MS), John Thune (SD), Deb
Fischer (NE), Jerry Moran (KS), and Marsha Blackburn (TN), introduced
the COVID-19 Consumer Data Protection Act (CCDPA) on May 7,
2020.150 The bill’s goal is to “regulate the data collected by coronavirus
contact tracing apps,”151 and it claims to give users agency over how their
data will be collected and disseminated, like requesting the user’s “affirmative express consent.”152 Other bill provisions would allow users to opt
out of data collection, revoke their consent, and anonymize the data once
the pandemic is over, along with other cybersecurity protection mandates.153
The bill, however, will likely be ineffective. For starters, the data
anonymization provision covers only data that was collected for the purpose of coronavirus contact tracing and not other data swept up in the
collection process.154 The bill also bypasses other stronger privacy protections provided by the FCC and prevents states from enacting their own
“stricter privacy protections in the absence of strong federal protections
at the FTC.”155 Most egregiously, CCDPA does not provide a private right
of action156 for injured parties.157
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of Sense, VERGE (May 1, 2020, 2:08 PM), https://perma.cc/C2X8-VP9L.
152 See id.; see also Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp.,
supra note 150.
153 Ashley Prickett Cuttino, COVID-19 Consumer Data Protection Act Announced by Republican Senators, NAT’L L. REV. (May 10, 2020), https://perma.cc/E3A9-JWAT.
154 See Lyons, supra note 151.
155 Id. See also Adam Schwartz, Two Federal COVID-19 Privacy Bills: A Good Start and
a Misstep, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (May 28, 2020), https://perma.cc/2ZKR-2VWY (“[The
CCDPA] preempts state laws, has no private right of action, and exempts a broad set of surveillance by employers.”).
156 “Circumstances when a court will determine that a law that creates rights also allows
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law.” Definition, Private Right of Action, QUIMBEE, https://perma.cc/2DHW-E7C4 (last visited Sept. 2, 2020).
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Ten days after the CCDPA was introduced, Democratic Senators
Richard Blumenthal (CT) and Mark Warner (VA), with Democratic Representatives Anna Eshoo (CA-18), Jan Schakowsky (IL-9), and Suzan
DelBene (WA-1), introduced their own privacy bill, titled the Public
Health Emergency Privacy Act (PHEPA).158 PHEPA is considered more
substantial regarding individual privacy protections than its Republican
counterpart: “It requires opt-in consent and data minimization, and limits
data disclosures to government. It has a strong private right of action and
does not preempt state laws. And it bars denial of voting rights to people
who decline to opt-in to tracking programs.”159 Even with these privacy
protections championed by privacy experts, there are still weaknesses, including “broad exemptions for manual contact tracing, public health research, public health authorities, and entities regulated by [HIPAA].”160
It also opens the door for potential discrimination—in areas like employment and education—should people decline to use tracking apps.161
Finally, a third bill, the Exposure Notification Privacy Act (ENPA),
was introduced on June 1, 2020, by Senators Maria Cantwell (D-WA) and
Bill Cassidy (R-LA).162 This bill specifically targets data collected from
“automated exposure notification service[s],” including contact tracing
apps.163 ENPA, like PHEPA, has a broad definition of the types of data it
would protect,164 but, like the CCPDA, it has a limited scope for a covered
entity.165 While narrowly confined to contact tracing apps, the scope of
ENPA’s application is not limited to the pandemic,166 a positive sign
when considering long-term privacy protections.
It is worth noting that not all the privacy legislation being passed
during the pandemic is necessarily related to the pandemic. While the intent behind the above bills may seem to favor individual privacy rights,
158
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the Senate negated this gesture by attempting to renew the USA
PATRIOT Act.167 Soon after the renewal bill’s announcement, then-Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell moved to amend the USA
PATRIOT Act and allow the FBI to collect data on “Americans’ webbrowsing and search histories without a warrant.”168 While this amendment is not directly part of any COVID-19 public health surveillance programs, it clearly follows the post-9/11 pattern of taking advantage of a
national crisis to strengthen the government’s reach into the privacy
sphere.
III: WHAT KINDS OF PROTECTIVE MEASURES WILL REDUCE THE
POTENTIAL FOR PRIVACY VIOLATIONS?
The similarities between post-9/11 and COVID-19 surveillance were
noticed almost immediately by the privacy community.169 Once again, the
government will use data collected from private, third-party corporations,
and the laws governing individual users’ privacy rights will not provide
much protection. While these kinds of broad-sweeping, data-grabbing
programs are a threat to any person, they disproportionately affect vulnerable communities in practice. Anti-Muslim ideology heavily influenced
determinations of who became a target of NSA terrorist surveillance post9/11.170 And throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, Asian-American communities, specifically Chinese-American communities, have been subjected to varying acts of racism, including hate crimes.171
Racism in data surveillance is inevitable, as non-white communities
maintain higher rates of infections and deaths from COVID-19.172 Black
Americans and other communities of color are already subject to much
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13, 2020, 4:09 PM), https://perma.cc/6JQS-CHXG; see also Ackerman, supra note 167 (“[The
amendments] will expressly permit the FBI to warrantlessly collect records on Americans’
web browsing and search histories.”).
169 See, e.g., Joel, supra note 1; Swire, supra note 2.
170 See Natasha Lennard, The NSA’s Racist Targeting of Individuals Is As Troubling as
Indiscriminate Surveillance, VICE (July 9, 2014, 2:40 PM), https://perma.cc/P2KN-XHD5.
171 See Anna Purna Kambhampaty, ‘I Will Not Stand Silent.’ 10 Asian Americans Reflect
on Racism During the Pandemic and the Need for Equality, TIME (June 25, 2020, 6:32 AM),
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1,800 reports of pandemic-fueled harassment or violence in 45 states and Washington, D.C.”).
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CONTROL & PREVENTION (Nov. 30, 2020), https://perma.cc/8YX4-78XE.
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higher rates of surveillance through local policing173 and federal agencies
like the FBI and NSA.174 This kind of surveillance has gone hand-in-hand
with justifying state-sanctioned violence and other aggressive control tactics against Black and Brown communities.175 And it has already manifested during the COVID-19 pandemic: At the beginning of New York
City’s quarantine, there were disturbing differences in how the NYPD enforced social distancing on Black and Hispanic communities compared to
white communities.176
Contact tracing policy must consider who will benefit from contact
tracing and health data surveillance, given institutionalized medical racism and the general health disparities that racism creates for Black and
Brown people overall.177 Houseless people who cannot afford data plans,
a severely at-risk population, will not have adequate access to contact
tracing technology.178 People in living conditions incompatible with digital contact tracing, like migrant workers sharing one mobile device or
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people in refugee camps experiencing unstable internet or internet blackouts, will not see the benefits of contact tracing technology.179 If this technology is not able to assist people in high-risk communities, the dangers
of broad surveillance do not justify the benefits.180 It is vital to implement
privacy protections to reduce the harm that, based on previous examples,
will befall the most vulnerable.
Those who have made the comparison between 9/11 and COVID-19
have provided insight on applying the lessons we learned, post-9/11, to
the current moment.181 Key pieces of advice, gleaned from the literature
then and now, include enforcing temporality (either in the surveillance
laws or in the ways that data can be stored),182 creating effective structures
of oversight to enforce limitations on surveillance programs,183 and
providing full transparency to the individual whose data is being collected
and disseminated so they know where that data is going and how it will
be used.184
Congress has acted quickly to respond to COVID-19, as it did immediately after 9/11. As mentioned in Part II, CCDPA, PHEPA, and
ENPA are three pieces of legislation, drafted shortly after the U.S. began
its pandemic response, that address contact tracing privacy concerns.185
Although PHEPA and ENPA contain promising aspects, rushed legislation made during a crisis requires “focused and balanced” updates as the
crisis continues.186 The USA PATRIOT Act had several provisions (e.g.,
Section 215) that sunsetted in May 2015.187 Even though this section was
essentially renewed via the Freedom Act with (allegedly) stricter limitations, the original provision was created with a sense of temporality.188
Including provisions that sunset provides an avenue for more “thoughtful
debate” afterwards189 or even an end to the intrusive, once-needed data
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policy altogether. The data are purportedly collected anonymously,190
though truly anonymous data has little value,191 especially when tracing
the spread of disease through a population.192 In fact, Android users are
required to turn on their device location setting, enabling GPS, to use the
contact tracing apps on their phone; this, perhaps obviously, causes trepidation in believing the software is “privacy preserving.”193 Even without
GPS data, the aggregate of enough data points can identify a user, so the
data should only be stored temporarily.194
There should be significant, external oversight—akin to the Privacy
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board’s oversight of the NSA—to ensure
the collected data has been useful in preventing the spread of COVID-19.
If the data has not proven useful, appropriate enforcement will be required
to prevent the unnecessary collection of data. Contact tracing through
BLE technology may also prove to be unreliable.195 External bodies like
the Department of Defense, Department of Justice, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
and FISC have the authority to investigate the NSA.196 Protections under
the Office for Human Research ensure that HHS complies with the law.197
HHS can also be internally inspected by the Office of Inspector General.198 These investigatory bodies should be regularly involved to make
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sure health data is being used correctly to prevent the spread of COVID19 and not continuously collected when it serves no purpose. There could
also be an investigatory commission (not like the Trump administration’s
coronavirus taskforce),199 that retains regulatory authority to track and
evaluate the government’s response to COVID-19 as the pandemic continues in the future.200
When asking people to comply with contact tracing apps, it is imperative that there be full transparency as to where their information is going.201 The revelations about the NSA’s surveillance activities, like what
Edward Snowden leaked or the decades of other surveillance projects,202
have sowed Americans’ distrust in state agencies.203 The justification for
keeping these programs secret, post-9/11, was to keep the intelligence out
of enemy hands.204 This justification, however, does not support government secrecy when invading individual privacy, as “[h]alf of Americans
say they are not at all or not too confident that the federal government will
keep their personal records safe from hackers or unauthorized users.”205
The Facebook surveys conducted by Carnegie Mellon researchers used
for tracking are eerily reminiscent of the Cambridge Analytica surveys
that manipulated users leading up to the 2016 presidential election and
other elections globally.206 These surveys could cause users to do a double-take, afraid that their responses will be sold by opportunistic third par-
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ties (e.g., Facebook) for their own financial gain. Full government transparency (especially when contracting with corporate third parties) will
encourage user engagement and increase the potential for success. While
HHS has relaxed HIPAA-related consent standards for covered entities
when distributing PHI to Public Health Authorities (and in some instances
to the media, family, and friends),207 user-provided consent must be considered integral to the COVID-19 contact tracing apps.208
CONCLUSION
It is expected that an emergency situation will require a quick response, but sometimes that results in responses that are not appropriate
for the emergency.209 Surveillance will be an integral part of containing
the coronavirus, but a common occurrence during national crises is for
the executive branch to take advantage of the moment to create new and
bold powers for the government, with little oversight.210 This overstep
was evident after 9/11, when the NSA intercepted communications and
gathered metadata from millions of American consumers through thirdparty telephone and internet providers.211 Many of those policies are still
in place; and even though they were amended some,212 there are still huge
chasms for individual privacy rights to fall into.213 Looking back at the
policy decisions from the Bush administration—and the fallout from
those decisions—will help create a safer legal space for the individual as
the government attempts to create a safer physical space during the pandemic.
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